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Most empirical evidence indicates that the costs of environmental regulation represent 
a minor fraction of total production costs. This finding is at odds with the assumption 
of stringent environmental regulation of both propo-nents and opponents of the 'Porter 
Hypothesis'. A possible explanation may be provided by examining the nego-tiation 
of environmental regulation in a 'political market'. In this market, stakeholder attempt 
to ensure their pre-ferred level of stringency through influencing political decision 
makers. In most cases, the equilibrium stringency will require pollution abatement 
levels that can be met with best available technology (BAT) or predictable ad-vances 
over BAT. Accordingly, net benefits from environmental regulation as claimed by a 
'strong version' of the 'Porter Hypothesis' are unlikely to emerge. On the other hand, 
competitiveness is equally unlikely to suffer. How-ever, compliance may impose 
disproportionate costs on technological laggards. The argument is illustrated with 
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I. Introduction 
In 1991, in a brief essay in the 'Scientific American', Michael Porter advanced a provocative hypothesis 
which has ever since fuelled a heated debate among environmental economists (e.g. Ayres 1994; Jaffe 
et al. 1995; Palmer et al. 1995; Porter/van der Linde 1995 a, b; Jaffe/Palmer 1997; Xepapadeas/de 
Zeeuw 1999, Sinclair-Desgagné 1999). Building upon earlier work by Ashford et al. (1979, 1985), Porter 
(1991) advanced the hypothesis that properly structured environmental regulation might not only benefit 
the environment and thus society at large but also the regulated industries by stimulating innovation. 
This would give rise to a win-win situation in which the traditional trade-off between environmental qual-
ity and competitiveness could be overcome. Unsurprisingly, the possibility that environmental regulation 
might boost competitiveness through innovation has attracted great interest in parts of the policy-making 
community (cf. most notably Gore 1992). 
Since Porter's argument is at odds with conventional wisdom in environmental economics, numerous 
subsequent studies have attempted to shed more light on the murky relationship between environmental 
regulation, subsequent behaviour of the regulated industries and its impact on competitiveness (e.g. 
Stewart 1993, Jaffe et al. 1995, Albrecht 1998, Newell et al. 1998). Empirical results are inconclusive. 
While there is some anecdotal that supports Porter's argument, more systematic econometric studies 
have failed to produce unequivocal results (cf. Jaffe et al. 1995, pp. 157-58). One striking result of these 
empirical investigations, however, is the fact that costs of compliance are typically very low compared to 
overall production costs (Stewart 1993, p. 2105, Jaffe et al. 1995, p. 158). 
These findings may have important implications for the discussion on the 'Porter Hypothesis'. Both pro-
ponents and opponents assume that environmental regulation imposes a substantial constraint, i.e. 
assume environmental regulation to be stringent. In both cases, this should be reflected in substantial 
gross cost of compliance1. Empirical evidence, however, suggests this to be rather an exception than 
the rule. Why is this so and what does it imply for the techno-economic consequences of environmental 
regulation? 
In this paper, a conceptual framework will be outlined to analyse how the stringency of actual environ-
mental regulation is determined. The starting point will be the metaphor of a 'political market', in which 
the stringency of environmental regulation is the outcome of an interaction between suppliers and de-
manders of environmental regulation. This will permit to draw some tentative conclusions as to the tech-
nological and economic consequences of environmental regulation. The relevance of these will be illus-
trated with empirical evidence on the techno-economic consequences of three Austrian VOC (Volatile 
Organic Compounds) emission standards. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, the 'Porter Hypothesis', some 
empirical evidence and its main assumption is discussed. This is followed by a description and qualita-
tive analysis of the 'political market of environmental regulation'. Section four is devoted to the discus-
sion of some key features of technological advance and the expected technological consequences of 
environmental regulation. In section five, the empirical evidence is presented. Finally, section six con-
cludes the paper by discussing the implications of the findings for the 'Porter Hypothesis' and by making 
some suggestions for future research. 
                                                       
1   Cost of compliance usually only measure expenditures due to regulation without considering possible benefits, such as more 
productive natural resources, which would have to be included in a proper estimate of the net cost of compliance.   2 
II.  The 'Porter Hypothesis' revisited 
According to traditional economic theory, environmental regulation imposes private costs of compliance 
but may yield social benefits. At the level of the compliant firm, environmental regulation is modelled as 
a constraint in a static maximisation problem. Since adding a constraint to a maximisation problem can-
not improve the outcome, it is argued that environmental regulation necessarily imposes private costs 
(cf. Palmer et al. 1995). When also considering the benefits that accrue to society through improved 
environmental quality, the overall effect, however, may be positive. For example, Repetto (1990) found 
that the total productivity of electric utilities had actually increased by an annual 0.68% for the period 
from 1970 to 1991, when also considering dollar values for environmental benefits derived from previ-
ous empirical studies, and not fallen by an annual 0.35% as indicated by measured productivity. 
Porter, however, argues that the posited conflict between environmental and economic goals at the level 
of the individual firm results from a static view of environmental regulation. If one drops the ceteris pari-
bus assumption on technology, products, processes and customers and acknowledges that a response 
to environmental regulation may change all these variables, the result may be dynamic competitive ad-
vantage. From a dynamic perspective, environmental regulation may actually 'trigger innovation that 
may partly or more than fully offset the costs [of compliance]' (Porter/van der Linde 1995b, p. 98). 
Firms may benefit in two ways from environmental regulation. First, by being forced to try harder, firms 
may discover ways to reduce their production costs through increased 'resource efficiency' since pollu-
tion is frequently 'a form of economic waste' (Porter/van der Linde 1995a, p. 122). Second, environ-
mental regulation may increase turnover and profits through creating markets for cleaner products and 
processes. This effect may be reinforced by a first-mover advantage if other countries subsequently 
introduce similar regulation. 
The fact that environmental regulation may create markets for green technology and green products is 
uncontested (e.g. Jaffe et al. 1995). However, if 'green' firms benefit, 'dirty' firms should lose. Also, no-
body denies that domestic firms may benefit from a first-mover advantage if domestic environmental 
regulation happens to precede the development in other countries (for empirical evidence see e.g. Boni-
fant 1994, Köppl/Pichl 1997, ELI 1999). But as a first-mover advantage can by definition only accrue to 
the first mover, the impact of this effect is naturally bounded. 
Thus, the main sticking point in the debate is Porter's assertion that environmental regulation may sys-
tematically confer private benefits on the regulated industries by stimulating efforts to increase resource 
efficiency and to generate cleaner products and processes. Under standard economic assumptions, this 
may only be true if either firms systematically fail to exploit all profitable investment opportunities or if 
there is some sort of externality (cf. e.g. Palmer et al. 1995, Sinclair-Desgagné 1999, Xepapadeas/de 
Zeeuw 1999). 
Porter and others cite a number of cases to back up their argument. Frequently quoted examples in the 
literature include the development of a substitute by DuPont in response to the phase out of ozone de-
pleting CFCs (e.g. Albrecht 1998), 3M's Pollution Prevention Pays (3P) program (Smart 1992) or the 
'energy contest' at the Louisiana Division of Dow Chemicals Co. in the US (Ayres 1994). Further evi-
dence can be found for example on EPA's homepage under 'Pollution Prevention Success Stories' 
(http://www.epa.gov/ps/p2case.htm). 
More systematic econometric tests of the issues addressed by the 'Porter Hypothesis' have either tried 
to find a relationship between environmental regulation and some measure of innovation or they have   3 
attempted to establish a link between environmental regulation and competitiveness. Examples of the 
first category find that compliance expenditures have a positive, albeit small effect on R&D expenditures 
by the regulated industry (Jaffe/Palmer 1997) and that regulatory compliance costs have a positive im-
pact on patenting of environmental technologies (Lanjouw/Mody 1996). Examples of the second cate-
gory yield inconclusive results. Two fairly recent, exhaustive reviews of this large literature (Stewart 
1993, Jaffe et al. 1995) conclude that studies estimating the impact of environmental regulation on ag-
gregate productivity, net-exports, overall trade flows, and plant-location decisions produced results that 
were either small, statistically insignificant or not robust to tests of model specification. 
In other words, systematic empirical estimates could neither establish the negative relationship between 
environmental regulation and competitiveness that would be expected from standard economic reason-
ing, nor could they find the positive relationship claimed by Porter and others. Possible explanations for 
this somewhat surprising result include the following. First, existing data is severely limited in its ability 
to measure the relative stringency of regulation, which hampers comparative analyses. Second, interna-
tional differences in regulatory stringency are usually not very pronounced. Third, the effectiveness of 
enforcement efforts is hard to measure. Finally, except for the most heavily regulated industries, the 
costs of complying with environmental regulation represent only a small fraction of total production costs 
(Stewart 1993, pp. 2105-06; Jaffe et al. 1995, pp. 158-59). 
The last point may have far-reaching consequences for the debate. If reported costs of compliance are 
typically rather low, actual environmental regulation does not appear to impose a significant constraint. 
Yet both possible positive or adverse effects of environmental regulation on innovation and hence com-
petitiveness critically hinge on the assumption that environmental regulation significantly constrains firm 
behaviour. Only if firms cannot comply at relatively low cost will the resulting costs of adjustment either 
hit their competitiveness, as standard economic theory would predict, or let them discover previously 
overlooked investment opportunities, as proponents of the 'Porter Hypothesis' assert. 
Consequently, an enquiry into the process how the stringency of an environmental regulation is deter-
mined seems warranted. Under what circumstances will environmental regulation be stringent? How 
stringent can actual environmental regulation be? What does this imply for the techno-economic conse-
quences of environmental regulation? The next two sections are devoted to a discussion of these is-
sues. 
III.  The political negotiation of environmental regulation 
The usual intellectual starting point for dealing with environmental regulation is welfare economics. Envi-
ronmental pollution is an example of a negative externality that prevents the economic system from 
attaining the state of Pareto-optimality. So as to ensure a Pareto-optimal outcome, some sort of institu-
tional solution – usually state intervention – must be found which curbs a polluting activity at a level 
where the marginal social benefits from that polluting activity equal its marginal social costs. Unfortu-
nately, this textbook situation hardly ever occurs in real-world settings as both benefit and cost curves 
are subject to considerable uncertainty. This is such a trivial and well-known observation that usually not 
much is made of it. 
One way to get around the problem is simply to assume the pollution abatement target to enter any 
economic problem as an exogenous constant (cf. seminally Baumol/Oates 1971). However, such a 
strategy leads to a rather odd separation between the behaviour of individuals in the market place, 
where institutional constraints are given, and their behaviour in the policy arena, where these institu-  4 
tional constraints are established and shaped (Majone 1976). Accordingly, so as to understand the 
regulatory process and its outcomes, it is necessary to deal with it explicitly. 
Given incomplete knowledge about both costs and benefits of an environmental regulation, policy mak-
ers must involve other actors to obtain necessary information and to negotiate a feasible solution. A 
fruitful way to conceptualise this process is through the metaphor of a 'political market' which has fre-
quently been used in the economic literature on 'public choice' and has also been employed in the con-
text of policy instrument choice in recent years (cf. Hahn 1990, Boyer/Laffont 1999, Keohane et al. 
1999). This market is composed of a number of self-interested participants who trade a commodity, 
namely their desired kind of environmental regulation, and pay for it by political support. Consequently, 
the subsequent analysis only applies to situations where politicians decide on environmental policy in-
terventions. 



















Figure 1 depicts potential stakeholders in this market in a schematic way. Solid lines indicate expected 
participation, while dotted lines stand for possible, but unlikely involvement. As indicated by the differ-
ently shaped frame, the media and scientists hold a special position in this framework for reasons ex-
plained below. On the supply side, there are politicians and bureaucrats. Bureaucrats devise and im-
plement environmental regulations while politicians adopt them. The demand side consists of firms, 
environmentalists, and possibly organised labour and consumer groups, all of whom demand different 
kinds of environmental regulation. Before attention can be focused on the expected outcome of the in-
teraction process, the characteristics and motivations of the different actors need to be examined in 
greater detail. 
Supply of environmental regulation 
Only elected politicians can adopt environmental regulation, for they alone have the power to legislate in 
democratic societies. Politicians derive utility from holding office, e.g. because it enables them to make 
policy, further the causes of their country or constituency, satisfy their ideological beliefs, enjoy the pres-
tige and perquisites of office, etc., all of which they can only enjoy as long as they are (re)elected. To be 
elected, politicians need electoral support. However, electoral support does not come for free, which is 
why politicians also need funding to set up and maintain the necessary political machinery, finance elec-
tion campaigns, and so on.   5 
Designing an environmental regulation is a time-consuming task (for example, in Austria the minimum 
period is about one year) that requires a lot of detailed information. Lacking both, politicians delegate 
this task to specialised bureaucrats. A bureau is essentially a non-profit organisation, financed by a 
periodic appropriation or grant, in exchange for which it produces some expected output (Niskanen 
1994, p. 271). Consequently, bureaucrats in charge of environmental protection will try to protect the 
environment and design environmental regulations, not only on politicians' request but also on their own 
initiative. For two sets of reasons, bureaucrats are expected to favour significant pollution abatement2. 
First, stringent regulations may allow them to enhance their status, influence, etc. Second, bureaucrats 
are highly risk-avers, as the only serious threat to a bureau is a crisis or a scandal, and will therefore 
actively try to draw up rules to 'cover their flanks' in all contingencies (cf. Wilson 1980). 
Lacking knowledge, time, and resources, politicians are unable to fully monitor bureaucrats, which pro-
vides the latter with some discretion to pursue their private goals, especially through their ability to se-
lectively pass on information and define the agenda and scope of a regulatory project. Thus, although 
politicians may reject a draft regulation, any amendments will be based on the drafts they receive from 
bureaucrats. 
Demand for environmental regulation 
Of course, actors do not demand regulation as such, they demand certain effects of regulation (Need-
ham 1983, p. 19). Therefore, each demander will attempt to shape environmental regulation in a way 
that matches his or her preferences. In other words, some agents will demand a lot of pollution abate-
ment, and other agents will demand less or even none. Demand may originate from two sources, firms 
and individuals. Individuals may be categorised as 'environmentalists', 'consumers', or 'workers', to the 
extent that they are affected by the environmental regulation's impact on environmental quality and 
human health, the prices of goods and services, and demand for labour, respectively. Clearly, individu-
als may fall in more than one category or switch roles depending on the situation and context. 
Single agents will rarely command sufficient political support to become a stakeholder in the political 
arena. For this reason, and since building political support is costly, firms and individuals will generally 
have to team up and form interest groups to influence the policy process. However, since environmental 
regulation is usually a public good3, any individual or firm will only receive a small share of the rewards 
for a direct lobbying effort which introduces a potential free-riding problem that limits the size of interest 
groups (cf. Olson 1965). Unless membership is compulsory, any interest group must offer its members 
sufficient benefits to make membership worthwhile. Involvement in the policy design process is then 
determined by comparing expected marginal benefits to expected marginal costs of lobbying. 
Firms can be expected to have less difficulties in organising than individuals as expected benefits from 
lobbying are more narrowly distributed which increases the incentive to spend resources on attaining 
them. Furthermore, membership is usually smaller, making individual contributions more significant. 
Also, firms tend to have more resources which may render even substantial contributions negligible. 
Conversely, citizen groups are much harder to organise, since benefits are widely spread, individual 
                                                       
2   Assuming a single type of bureaucratic behaviour is a gross simplification. More accurately, the behaviour described in this 
paragraph only applies to bureaucrats who spend their whole career in the bureau. If they pursue careers outside bureau either 
in politics or in industry, they will try not to displease these groups which may modify their behaviour (cf. Wilson 1980, p. 374). 
3   Regulation need not necessarily be non-exclusive. Loopholes, narrow clauses or special exemptions may provide sufficient 
incentive for some individuals to lobby on their own (cf. Keohane et al. 1999, p. 331).   6 
contributions are much smaller and the necessary number of members to attain critical mass tends to 
be much bigger. Lacking a compelling moral mission that may help environmental pressure groups to 
overcome the associated free-riding problem, consumer groups and organised labour will therefore find 
it difficult to take up a role in the policy process. 
These arguments suggest that among citizen groups, only environmental pressure groups should be 
expected to be significant demanders of environmental regulation. Industry organisations, on the other 
hand, will certainly be involved in the negotiation process, both for the above reasons and because firms 
hold more accurate information on the true costs of pollution abatement which renders their participation 
indispensable. As a result, industry organisations are very likely to be over-represented in the negotia-
tion process relative to other demanders of environmental regulations (cf. Keohane et al. 1998, pp. 331-
33). 
What kind of environmental regulation will these two groups of actors demand? Since environmental 
advocacy groups are commonly funded through membership fees and contributions, they will demand 
highly visible and hence substantial pollution reduction. Similarly, firms will also try to benefit from envi-
ronmental regulation or at least avoid any negative impact on their competitiveness. Thus, unless there 
is an overriding positive effect, firms will strive to avoid costly pollution abatement that would force them 
to change their standard operating procedures by pointing to substantial compliance costs. But what 
could be such an overriding positive effect, or more generally, how can firms benefit from environmental 
regulation? Here are a few examples. 
First, environmental regulation favours producers of 'green' products, technologies or services over 
producers of 'dirty' products, technologies or services. In this respect, environmental regulation almost 
inevitably produces winners or losers. Therefore, firms from the former group may favour regulation that 
increases demand for their 'green' products, technologies, or services. Thus, these firms may favour 
strict environmental regulation to increase the market for their output. Second, not all firms operate at or 
nearby the production possibility frontier. Assuming that 'progressive firms' which operate in the vicinity 
of this frontier have greater skills and competencies than 'conservative firms' which lag behind, the for-
mer group may expect to benefit relative to the latter from an external shock. Third, incumbent firms 
may take advantage of environmental regulation to raise barriers to entry. Fourth, environmental regula-
tion may work as a non-tariff trade barrier. In this case, domestic firms may try to influence domestic 
environmental regulation in a way that it favours them over their foreign rivals. 
Thus, in any of the four cases, some firms may attempt to use environmental regulation to create new 
markets or to restrain competition in existing markets. In the latter three cases, this may even imply that 
they are willing to accept costly policy interventions as long as their rivals are hurt even more. Thus, 
industry is essentially in a cartel situation where some firms may have an incentive to defect and dis-
close information to policy makers that compliance is less costly than claimed by industry's 'official' line. 
Whether defection will indeed occur then depends on the remaining firms' ability to sanction potential 
defectors. Actual sanctioning mechanisms will have to be established on a case by case basis, but one 
generalisable mechanism found to be relevant in the author's work on Austrian environmental regulation 
was pressure exerted by customers of potential defectors who were vehemently opposed to using infe-
rior products that would have been a consequence of very strict environmental regulation. 
Scientists and the media stand apart from all other actors in this framework, in that both are crucial in 
building up pressure for public intervention, but a priori hold no stake in the negotiation process. Scien-
tific findings trigger public perception of an environmental problem, if the media pick up the issue and a 
societal communication processes commences (cf. Luhmann 1989). However, while environmental risks   7 
make excellent headlines to maximise circulation or audience in order to attract advertising money4, the 
actual details of a policy intervention are usually far too specific to appeal to the general public. Hence, 
media attention is expected to wane once an impression can be created that 'something is done about 
the issue'. 
Of course, if either group of actors chooses to pursue its private agenda as 'environmentalist', 'con-
sumer', or 'worker', it may become important demanders of environmental regulation. Given that knowl-
edge about environmental problems is usually incomplete, scientific expert advice is required at all 
stages of the environmental regulation process. This provides scientists with substantial scope for shap-
ing the stakeholders' perception of the issue. Similarly, the media command substantial power over 
public opinion and may try to influence the negotiation process through this mechanism. Although these 
are fascinating and to the author's knowledge entirely unexplored issues in the economics literature, an 
analysis would go beyond the scope of this paper. 
Matching supply with demand 
Designing and adopting an environmental regulation is a costly process. Given limited resources, politi-
cians will only devote their scarce attention and time to an environmental problem if there is sufficient 
political demand for a policy intervention. In this context, it is useful to distinguish two categories of envi-
ronmental hazards. Hazards of the former category are so dangerous that the only appropriate re-
sponse is an immediate ban, irrespective of any adjustment costs that this might impose. Hazards of the 
latter category are characterised by a rather imprecise knowledge about the risks that they might pose 
at some future date. However, examples from the former category are more appropriately referred to as 
health or safety hazards for they pose a direct and immediate threat to human health, and typically oc-
cur e.g. in the pharmaceutical industry. The only 'environmental' example the author can think of is the 
emission of TCDD (dioxin) that may result from overheating in the production of trichloro phenol. Typical 
'environmental hazards', such as the emission of NOx, CO2, VOCs, or CFCs, rather fall in the second 
category. For such hazards, the desired amount of pollution abatement is determined in a political nego-
tiation process in which politicians match supply and demand for different amounts of pollution abate-
ment. 
In this process, politicians need to consider the interests of voters. Some voters may be primarily con-
cerned with environmental quality, while other voters may not bother at all and only care about their 
material well-being. The majority of voters, however, is assumed to care about both. For the kind of 
environmental hazards defined above, these voters will demand and support pollution abatement pro-
vided that it does not significantly reduce their material wealth. However, politicians do not need support 
from all voters. In democratic societies, holding office only requires a certain, institutionally defined ma-
jority of votes5. Moreover, most voters tend to be myopic and rather poorly informed, which allows politi-
cians to pursue private goals, i.e. their own ideological preferences and the goals of special interests to 
the extent that these are able to wield political support, e.g. through influencing and mobilising the elec-
torate, financial contributions, and lobbying. The relative importance of either of these mechanisms de-
pends on the institutional framework. For example, while campaign contributions are crucial in the US, 
they only play a minor role in many European countries where political parties are publicly funded. 
                                                       
4   Even publicly funded media that do not rely on advertising money for funding must care about circulation or audience to justify 
public support. 
5   In fact, in political systems with majority voting, politicians or political parties may not even require majority support. They only 
need to have sufficient support to hold the balance of power which ensures that no coalition can be formed without them.   8 
In choosing an equilibrium quantity of pollution abatement, politicians thus maximise a composite utility 
function which comprises the utility of the relevant constituencies and interest groups and their own. 
Formally, the utility P of a policy x is given by () () () () x v x v x v x P
N N m m m + + + = ...
2 2 1 1 , where  () x v
i  
stands for the utility function of component i (i=1,…,N) of P and
i m  denotes its 'political influence weight' 
(cf. van Winden 1999, pp. 10-14). The solution to this problem thus depends on a) the size of each 
() x v
i , and b) the size of each 
i m . Realistically, at least some of the  () x v
i  will interdepend. For exam-
ple, while firms will generally try to oppose costly pollution abatement, pressure from environmentalists 
may affect this stance. 
To make the decision problem even more complicated, politicians only know about their own utility while 
they cannot fully assess the other players' utility in this framework. They do know that marginal political 
benefits of an intervention increase with the visibility and danger of an environmental problem while 
marginal costs increase with the number of jobs that might be lost in the future. However, they do not 
know about the exact size of either effect and must therefore base their decision on the information they 
receive from interest groups, mostly via bureaucrats (which may bias the outcome towards higher strin-
gency). 
In particular, politicians need to consult with industry (representatives) on the consequences of a pollu-
tion reduction on profits and employment. Thus, politicians need to assess by how much pollution can 
be reduced without forcing firms to discontinue domestic operation (i.e. either relocate to a country with 
lower environmental standards or go out of business), both because industry commands considerable 
power in the political arena (because of its superior ability to organise, industry's political influence 
weightm is bigger than all other
i m ), and because typical environmental hazards are too uncertain to 
warrant any sizeable job losses. 
The ultimately prescribed amount of pollution reduction crucially depends on the information policymak-
ers receive from firms about the costs of pollution abatement. This can only be estimated on the basis of 
existing technology or predictable improvements of existing technology, since no information exists 
about technology that is not yet available. Unless pollution abatement is exceptionally inexpensive, the 
most likely outcome under these circumstances is environmental regulation that will require some pollu-
tion abatement to satisfy environmentalists and prove to the electorate that 'something was done about 
the problem' but that can certainly be attained by the large majority of affected firms without significant 
harmful economic consequences, including no sizeable negative impact on competitiveness. Other out-
comes are possible, but less likely, as they would require special configurations, such as exceptionally 
high public pressure (which was ruled out above for typical environmental problems), an exceptionally 
radical anti-business stance among politicians and/or bureaucrats, or policymakers completely captured 
by firms that expect to benefit from a stricter environmental regulation. 
IV.  Environmental regulation and technological advance  
What do these observations imply for the expected technological consequences of environmental regu-
lation? To answer this question, it is necessary to establish some stylised features of technological ad-
vance. Although technologies are incredibly diverse and different technologies are governed by totally 
different physical and/or chemical principles, decades of research on the economics of innovation of 
technological change have revealed a few important regularities.   9 
First, although technologies are surprisingly malleable and do respond to external changes such as 
relative factor prices (cf. Newell et al. 1999), they are nowhere as malleable to fit standard micro-
economic models. Thus, if environmental considerations dictate certain performance characteristics of a 
technology, there is a very good chance that these will be met at some point in the future. However, 
when this will be and how these requirements will be achieved is uncertain. 
Second, technological advance can be pictured as an evolutionary process punctuated by periods of 
discontinuous change (cf. Anderson/Tushman 1990). Extended periods of stable, incremental advance 
are interrupted by rare and unpredictable discontinuities, which introduce massive uncertainty. These 
technological breakthroughs trigger a period of technological experimentation or ferment, in which com-
peting designs vie for dominance, both because the potentials of the technology are ill-understood and 
because the ultimate, optimal shape to meet eventual demand is not yet clear. As more and more ex-
perience is acquired, the competing design configurations tend to converge to a 'dominant design' 
(Abernathy/Utterback 1978). The emergence of a 'dominant design' ends the period of ferment and 
ushers in a period of incremental improvements within the dominant architecture. This period is charac-
terised by fairly stable patterns of change along so-called 'technological trajectories' (Dosi 1982, p. 152), 
i.e. the economic and technological trade-offs defined by the design configuration and the way how 
scientists and engineers view the technology and its potentials for development. Consequently, incre-
mental change within the dominant architecture is much easier to predict than discontinuous change. 
Third, technological discontinuities introduce order-of-magnitude improvements in terms of cost, per-
formance and/or quality over existing technology. These are the radical innovations so vividly described 
by Schumpeter as the innovations that 'strike not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of existing 
firms, but at their foundations and very lives' (Schumpeter 1942, p. 84). In contrast, although there is 
disagreement in the literature on this point (cf. Anderson/Tushman 1990, p. 618), cumulative techno-
logical performance improvement is much smaller during periods of continuous, incremental change. 
Fourth, technological innovation requires appropriate knowledge. Innovations are commonly defined as 
new or novel combinations of existing knowledge. However, firms are heterogeneous both in terms of 
their knowledge base and their ability to generate innovations. Thus, while most firms can be expected 
to master modest improvements, more radical improvements may exceed the abilities of some or most 
firms. 
Fifth, developing a new technology takes time. Although development can be speeded up by increasing 
R&D spending (cf. Mansfield et al. 1981), development will never be instantaneous. For example, the 
average period between the first consideration of a process-integrated pollution abatement measure 
and its implementation is 8-10 years in the German chemical industry (Faber et al. 1994, p. 60). Simi-
larly, long-term performance tests for new corrosion protection coatings may take up to 15 years.  
Above, it was argued that policymakers need to be certain that compliance with an environmental regu-
lation does not impose major economic costs on the majority of the affected firms. The only way how 
policymakers can be reasonably certain about this is if compliance is technically feasible with existing 
technology or with predictable improvements of this technology (note only the popularity of best avail-
able technology (BAT) clauses). In terms of the language used above, this means that compliance must 
be feasible with existing design configurations or with foreseeable improvements within the design archi-
tecture of these configurations. The latter may require vigorous R&D efforts but improvements will have 
to be attainable with near certainty.   10 
More radical change is too uncertain to serve as a basis for environmental regulation. First, nobody 
knows how long it will take to develop such technology. Second, nobody knows what this technology will 
look like and what it will imply for the structure of the industry. Tushman and Anderson (1986) draw a 
useful distinction between 'competence-enhancing' and 'competence-destroying' discontinuous techno-
logical advance, where the former allows incumbents to strengthen their position while the latter triggers 
a wave of new entrants. Given that environmental regulation is negotiated with incumbent firms, there is 
every reason to expect that these will try to avoid the latter situation. Third, such radical advance may 
go beyond the technical capabilities of some or most firms, who will therefore attempt to oppose it. In 
both cases, firms can point to potential job losses and expect to be heard by politicians. 
Under these circumstances, the expected technological consequence of environmental regulation is at 
most incremental improvements of BAT. If 'green' technological breakthroughs occur, they are expected 
to do so independently of environmental regulation. However, once they have emerged, they may then 
serve as a basis for new regulation, which may have been the prime motivation for firms to develop 
them in the first place. 
At the level of the industry, this will mean little or no technological advance on what is already techno-
logically feasible. However, this does not mean that no change may occur. At the level of the industry, 
compliance may for example require the substitution of a dominant design configuration with a different 
design that has already been available but was not widely used. If this design comes to dominate the 
market, it will certainly be improved in the diffusion process, as technologies never cease to evolve as 
long as they are in use. The same applies if compliance only requires changes within the design con-
figuration of the dominant design6. 'Natural trajectories' such as changes in the scale of production, 
improvement of process yields, improvement in inputs materials, improvements in product characteris-
tics and design for market segments (Cohen 1995, p. 220) govern the evolution of every technology. 
At the level of the individual firm, however, there may be a need of substantial change. All firms will 
have mastered the dominant design, but this need not be the case for an alternative design required for 
compliance. Therefore, unless environmental regulation is extremely lax, technological laggards can be 
expected to suffer. However, the aggregate political weight of these 'victims' must be comparatively low, 
otherwise they could effectively veto the environmental regulation by playing the 'job-loss card'. In the 
next section, some empirical evidence on the arguments in the two preceding sections shall be pre-
sented. 
V.  Some empirical evidence on Austrian VOC emission standards 
Background information and data sources 
VOCs (Volatile Organic Compounds) are highly reactive organic chemical compounds that play a major 
role in ground-level ozone formation. In the presence of sunlight, VOCs react with NOx emitted e.g. by 
road traffic or combustion processes to form ground-level ozone. As a so-called secondary air pollutant, 
ground-level ozone formation cannot be directly tackled but can only be combated by reducing the 
emission of its main precursor substances. 
In the mid- and late 1980s, ground level ozone had become a major environmental concern in Austria. 
This concern eventually led to the implementation of a series of three legislative measures to reduce the 
                                                       
6   This also covers the most frequent compliance strategy by means of end-of-pipe equipment.   11 
use and emission of VOCs in paints, coatings, printing inks, and adhesives as well as their application in 
industrial production processes. The regulatory measures in question were the Solvent Ordinance, is-
sued in 1991, on which work started in mid-1990, the amended Solvent Ordinance 1995, and the Paint 
Shop Ordinance, both issued in 1995. 
These regulations outlawed the industrial use and sale of systems containing CFCs and benzene as of 
July 1, 1992, and restricted the maximum content of aromatics and organic solvents in paints, coatings, 
printing inks and adhesives to 5 and 10 (15) mass-percent, respectively, as of Jan 1, 1996 (safe for a 
number of exemptions). However, if required by foreign customers, exports were exempt from the re-
strictions on organic solvents. Furthermore, all users of the products in question who emitted more than 
a very low threshold of VOCs (2000 kg/a) were required to either switch to low-solvent or solvent-free 
systems or to install appropriate end-of-pipe equipment that would ensure similar abatement levels. For 
new installations, these requirement applied as of Jan 1, 1996. Depending on their size, existing instal-
lation had to meet slightly less restrictive emission limits as of Jan 1, 1998 and Jan 1, 2000, respec-
tively. 
Although Austria was rather a late-comer to restrict the use of VOCs (the first VOC regulations date 
back to the 60s in the US and the 70s in Germany), the Austrian standards were and still are by far the 
strictest in the world in terms of emission limits and maximum organic solvent content. Furthermore, one 
of the stated aims of this legislative initiative was to speed up the development and use of cleaner sub-
stitutes to solvent-based systems. For these two reasons, the standards are an excellent example to 
study some of the issues raised above. 
By regulating both the production and the use of solvent-borne systems, the standards affect a large 
number of industries. Apart from the chemical industry, where the products in question are produced, 
the standards also apply to every industry that uses coatings, printing inks, or adhesives above a rela-
tively small scale. In the manufacturing sector, this amounts to approximately 2,9007 firms out of a total 
of 24,5007. 
In the following, some of the conjectures put forward above shall be confronted with empirical evidence 
drawn from official statistical sources and a survey on the techno-economic consequences of Austrian 
VOC emission standards on Austrian manufacturers of the products in question. The survey consisted 
of a series of 28 standardised interviews with R&D managers or board members of all Austrian produc-
ers of coatings, printing inks and adhesives except one. Mere trading outlets of foreign companies were 
not included in the investigation. Although precise figures cannot be determined, the sample covers 
more than 90% of revenues and employment in these industries. 
The data is limited in two important respects. First, the survey only covers a comparatively small subset 
of affected firms8, and is hence only representative of a very particular industry, not of all firms affected 
by the VOC emission standards. Second, after Austria's accession to the European Union in 1995, the 
                                                       
7   These numbers are derived from an ex-ante study based on data from 1988 by the Federal Environmental Agency (UBA 1993) 
which attempted to estimate the potential emission reduction from a Paint Shop ordinance. Given the poor quality of the avail-
able data, the figures should be interpreted as an upper limit subject to a considerable margin of error. 
8   The original plan of the study had been to survey both producers and users of the products in question. Unfortunately, the latter 
part fell victim to public budget cuts that became necessary to qualify for the Euro.   12 
classification of official data was completely overhauled which renders any comparison of data before 
and after that data virtually impossible9. 
The economic impact of Austrian VOC emission standards 
Available data does not permit a sophisticated analysis of the economic impact of Austrian VOC emis-
sion standards. It does, however, allow to identify some very rough trends. In particular, any markedly 
positive or negative impact of the standards in question should show up as a clear structural break in 
the data. 
Since 1995, data on environmental compliance costs by industry has become available, since 1997 it is 
published annually10. Table 1 reports the figures for the main industries affect by the VOC emission 
standards. Manufacturing and the chemical industry are listed at the bottom of the table to give a feeling 
for proportions. The second column displays data on environmental expenditures as a fraction of total 
expenditures, the third column shows environmental expenditures and investment as a share of total 
expenditures and investment and the fourth column reports the results for environmental investment as 
a fraction of total investment. 
Table 1: Environmental Expenditures 
 Environmental  Expenditures/ 
Total Expenditures 
Environmental Expenditures and Investment/ 
Total Expenditures and Investment 
Environmental Investment/ 
Total Investment 
Industry  1995 1997 1998  1995  1997  1998  1995 1997 1998 
Coatings and Printing Ink <243*>  0.39 0.40 0.40  0.63  0.65  0.69  5.08 7.35 6.48 
Leather and Leather Products <19>  0.11  0.32  0.24  0.19 0.79 0.36  3.30  12.57  3.68 
Wood and Wood Products (excluding 
furniture) <20> 
0.17 0.13 0.13  0.32  0.16  0.26  2.28 0.61 2.16 
Publishing, Printing and Reproduction of 
Recorded Media <22> 
0.16 0.04 0.03  0.15  0.06  0.06  0.05 0.37 0.49 
Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery 
and Equipment <28, 29> 
0.07 0.08 0.08  0.14  0.16  0.13  1.47 1.65 1.11 
Transport Equipment <34, 35>  0.10 0.09 0.09  0.23  0.31  0.29  2.93 3.93 4.56 
Furniture; Manufacturing n.e.c. <36>  0.12 0.09 0.12  0.29  0.17  0.19  3.38 1.83 1.57 
Construction <45>  0.07 0.06 0.06  0.08  0.07  0.07  0.37 0.25 0.21 
Manufacturing <D>  0.45 0.40 0.51  0.66  0.56  0.66  4.53 3.17 3.14 
Chemicals and Chemical Products <24>  0.94 1.42 1.31  1.19  1.62  1.57  5.51 4.25 5.33 
Source: Statistic Austria, own calculations.  * NACE categories 
Two features stand out: First, compliance expenditures are generally rather low, which matches interna-
tional findings. In particular, compliance expenditures are lower than in the overall manufacturing sector 
and considerably lower than in the total chemical industry, which throughout the world is known as one 
of the most heavily regulated industries. Second, precious little appears to have changed. Expect for the 
leather and leather products industry which reports a substantial hike both for compliance expenditures 
and environmental investment, compliance expenditures are flat or even declining with respect to 1995. 
There is greater fluctuation in the column on environmental investments, yet the trend is patchy across 
                                                       
9   Foreign trade: Before 1995, all data was recorded at the border. Since 1995 this only applies to third-country trade, while intra-
EU trade is measured by a selective survey, which introduced significant adjustment problems. 
Production: Before 1995, all data was organised by economic activity. Since 1995, production data follows the PRODCOM clas-
sification, which is based on technological criteria. Production volumes are only reported at the 10-digit level, many of which 
cannot be disclosed because of privacy requirements (less than 3 firms per category). Therefore, aggregate figures are only 
available for production values. 
10   Statistic Austria experienced major difficulties in the changeover after Austria's accession to the EU. Questionnaires on envi-
ronmental compliance costs were sent out so late in 1995 that the next round could only be conducted in 1997.   13 
industries. While the share of environmental investment is growing in the transport equipment industry, it 
is declining in furniture or the metal and machinery industries. However, any rises in environmental in-
vestment can be attributed to compliance with VOC emission standards, as these were the only signifi-
cant new environmental regulations introduced at that time. VOC emission standards therefore seem to 
have stimulated some environmental investment. Except for the leather industry, however, the impact 
appears to have been modest. 
Figure 2 displays further evidence on the economic impact of Austrian VOC emission standards. Two 
sets of effects must be distinguished. First, the standards may reduce demand for coatings, printing 
inks, and adhesives, as the cheapest way to reduce emissions and maintain the technological advan-
tages of conventional systems is to increase application efficiency to reduce emissions and thereby stay 
below the compliance threshold11. Second, if the standards impose a constraint on affected firms, this 
should show up in the trade data. Recall that the standards apply equally to domestic and foreign firms 
in Austria. Moreover, exports are largely exempt from the limits imposed by the VOC standards (this 
exemption was only introduced after vehement lobbying by industry representatives). Thus, if the stan-
dards work as a non-tariff trade barrier, e.g. because foreign firms are unwilling to develop special prod-
ucts for a comparatively small market, Austrian firms should be able to win market share. On the other 
hand, if compliance diverts resources or if domestic firms are unable to reap economies of scale be-
cause they have to manufacture different products for the domestic market and foreign ones, exports 
should suffer. 
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Source: Statistic Austria, own calculations. 
Data on the evolution of imports, exports, domestic production, and domestic demand (i.e. domestic 
production plus imports minus exports) of paints, coatings, printing inks, and adhesives in Austria (cf. 
Figure 2) measured by volume12 provides some clues on both effects. Generally, demand for the prod-
                                                       
11   Conventional spraying, the simplest and most versatile application technique, has an application efficiency of < 30%. 
12   As explained in footnote 9, production volumes are not directly available. However, for approximately half of the total production 
value, volumes are also available via PRODCOM 10-digit categories. These were used to compute weighted unit values for 
each year. Dividing the reported total production value by these unit values allowed to approximate actual total production vol-
umes. Although the resulting figures are only an imperfect substitute for the true data, they are plausible in light of the interview 
evidence and are therefore reported.   14 
ucts in question tends to grow roughly in line with GDP. While this was true for 1997, in 1998 and 1999 
domestic demand failed to keep up with GDP growth. Thus, the VOC emission standards seem to have 
led to a modest slowdown in domestic demand for the regulated products, which was also reported by 
the surveyed producers. 
There is no evidence that the standards helped Austrian firms to gain market share in Austria, as the 
share of imports in total domestic demand increased from about 52% in 1996 to around 65% in 1999. 
Assuming no re-exports, this would actually point to a loss of market share of domestic firms. On the 
other hand, the balance of trade in the products in question improved over the same period as exports 
grew substantially quicker than imports. Although all the results are blurred by the impact of Austria's 
accession to the EU which lowered barriers to trade, interestingly both with the EU and also with third 
countries (cf. Breuss 2000, p. 173), the results for this particular industry are slightly better than for the 
overall economy (cf. Breuss 2000, p. 175). This is particularly remarkable for 1996 (+16 vs. +12%), the 
year when firms should have struggled most with compliance. Similar evidence comes from the sur-
veyed firms directly, who were asked whether VOC emission standards had had any lasting impact on 
their competitiveness in Austria, the EU (and EFTA), and other countries13. Table 2 displays the results 
to this question. The large majority of firms reported to have neither suffered nor benefited from the 
regulation in all three areas. Some firms, however, reported that their competitiveness deteriorated (10-
15%) and a roughly equal number of firms declared to have gained. 
Table 2: Reported Impact of VOC Emission Standards on Competitiveness 
  Austria  EU/EFTA  Other Countries 
unaffected  75.0% 66.7%  79.0% 
deteriorated  14.3% 11.1%  10.5% 
improved  10.7% 22.2%  10.5% 
Source: Survey results. 
To summarise, these results match the findings of other empirical studies that actual environmental 
regulation appears to have little economic impact, which is also the expected result if one believes that 
environmental regulations are politically negotiated in the way described above. Some firms may benefit 
and others may suffer, but the large majority will remain virtually unaffected. Is there also empirical sup-
port for the expected technological consequences of such environmental regulation? 
Austrian VOC emission standards and technological change 
Conventional measures of innovation and technological change include R&D expenditures and patent 
counts (cf. Jaffe/Palmer 1997, Lanjouw/Mody 1996). As shown in Table 3, R&D intensity (R&D expendi-
tures as a fraction of revenues) in the surveyed industries did increase slightly (and statistically insignifi-
cantly) from 4.03% in 1990 to 5.07% in 1998. This is no unexpected result as compliance may require 
technological adaptations which may show up in higher R&D spending. However, so as to test the con-
clusions put forward above, data on the quality and the targets of this R&D is required. For this purpose, 
neither R&D spending nor patents are appropriate. 
Table 3: R&D Intensity in the Austrian Coatings, Printing Ink, and Adhesive Industry 
 Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
1990 4.03  3.12 1  15 
1998 5.07  3.32 2  15 
                                                      
13   The category 'other countries' mainly comprises reform countries from Central- and Eastern Europe. Trade with the U.S. and 
Asia is negligible.   15 
Source: Survey results. 
To find out about whether compliance could be attained with existing technology, firms were asked in 
the survey when they had started work on alternative, low-solvent or solvent-free technologies. Table 4a 
shows the results to this question. Responses fall more or less evenly into four categories. Roughly 30% 
of the firms had started with R&D in alternative technologies before 1970. About a quarter of the firms 
had done so before 1980. Another 22% of the firms started in the 1980s. Finally, the remaining 22% 
only started after 1990, of which a full half only did so in 1995. These figures indicate that more than 
three quarters of the interviewed firms had some experience in alternative technologies prior to 1990, 
i.e. before the negotiation of the first Solvent Ordinance commenced. 
Table 4a: R&D in Low-Solvent Technologies 
until 1970  29.6% 
until 1980  25.9% 
until 1990  22.2% 
after 1990  22.2% 
of which in 1995  11.1% 
Source: Survey results. 
Table 4b provides a finer breakdown of these results by displaying similar information on the different 
cleaner technological compliance options presently available. The most widely used option are water-
borne systems which are manufactured by almost 93% of the interviewed firms. The second-most popu-
lar technology are high-solid systems which are produced by almost 52% of the firms in the sample. 
Radiation-curing systems are manufactured by 37% of the firms, while powder coatings are a fairly mar-
ginal technology that are manufactured by only around 7% of the firms. Development in all four tech-
nologies started long before the introduction of Austrian VOC emission standards. In water-borne sys-
tems, R&D had started as early as 1940. High-solid systems were first developed in Austria in 1955. 
Work on radcure systems started in 1970 and first R&D in powder-coatings occurred in 1974. 
Table 4b: R&D in Low-Solvent Technologies 
Quartiles  Water-Borne Systems  Powder Coatings  High Solid Systems  Radiation Curing Systems 
25% 1970 1974  1978.75 1980.25 
50% 1979 1977  1984  1986.5 
75% 1989 1980  1991  1990.25 
Minimum 1940  1974  1955  1970 
Maximum 1995  1980  1994  1991 
Share  92.6% 7.4%  51.9%  37.0% 
Source: Survey results. 
Furthermore, Table 4b displays the quartiles when 25, 50, and 75% of the firms in the sample had 
started to conduct R&D in the respective technologies. In all four cases, 75% of the interviewed produc-
ers of coatings, printing inks and adhesives had done so before or at the time when the first Austrian 
Solvent Ordinance was devised. Finally, all firms started developing cleaner alternatives to solvent-
borne systems before the main restrictions imposed by the Solvent Ordinance entered into force. 
The results show that all four compliance options had been known for a considerable period of time to a 
large majority of the affected firms. Moreover, the results show that no new technological compliance 
option was developed in response to the strictest VOC regulation in the world. Finally, the results show 
that even relative latecomers started their R&D in cleaner substitute technologies before the regulations 
entered into force.    16 
However, the fact that firms conduct R&D does not convey any information on the quality or intensity of 
that R&D effort. Developing new technologies is very time consuming and firms tend to work on many 
technologies that do not necessarily have to show up in the output produced and sold (cf. Patel/Pavitt 
1997). Therefore, firms were also asked how big a technological step was required to develop products 
that complied with the VOC emission standards. Table 5 shows how firms responded to this question. 
Table 5: Technological Adaptations in Response to VOC Regulations 
  Water-Borne Systems  Powder Coatings  High Solid Systems  Radiation Curing Systems 
a small step  17%  -  -  - 
a series of small steps  50%  -  61%  33% 
a large, radical step  33%  -  31%  67% 
Source: Survey results.   * The percentages express the share of answers by firms 
   that manufacture the respective technologies. 
Powder coatings did not have to be adapted for compliance, as they are non-liquid systems that do not 
contain any solvents. The remaining systems needed some adaptation. For the majority of firms, this 
involved incremental improvements ('a small step' or 'a series of small steps') over what had already 
been the state of the art in the respective firm. With water-borne systems, 67% of the firms could comply 
with incremental changes, while 33% had to make radical alterations. Similarly, 61% of the firms could 
comply with high-solid systems by making a series of small changes. Radcure systems stand out in that 
a majority of 67% had to make radical changes and only 33% of the firms could comply with incremental 
developments. This may be explained by the fact that radcure systems are the most recent technologi-
cal option in this field and are therefore less-well explored than their rival technologies. 
The numbers support the conjecture that the majority of firms will be able to comply with small adapta-
tions. It also shows that some firms apparently had to struggle much harder. It should be noted that the 
results in Table 5 probably overstate the true adaptation triggered by the environmental regulations. A 
proper estimate of this would have to establish 'normal' technological advance in all the compliance 
options and then try to determine the 'supra-normal' component triggered exclusively by the need to 
comply with the environmental regulations. Unfortunately, this cannot be done in a survey. 
VI.  Conclusions and directions for further research 
There is a very small literature on the technological consequences of actual environmental regulation 
(cf. Kemp 2000). According to these studies, the most common responses to environmental regulation 
are incremental innovations in process and products and the diffusion of existing technology. The pre-
sent paper represents an attempt to make sense of these observations and relate them to the on-going 
discussion on the 'Porter Hypothesis' in environmental economics. 
It is commonly assumed that actual environmental regulation imposes a substantial constraint on eco-
nomic behaviour. Empirical data on the actual costs of compliance, however, appears to suggest the 
opposite. So as to make sense of this puzzling result, a conceptual argument was put forward according 
to which the stringency of actual environmental regulation is determined by the interplay of a number of 
self-interested stakeholders in a 'political market'. Because environmental hazards tend to be uncertain, 
resulting equilibrium stringency will induce some behavioural changes subject to the constraint that 
these do not overburden industry (cf. Verbruggen 1994). As a consequence, environmental regulation is 
not expected to have a sizeable negative impact on competitiveness. 
With respect to technology, this implies that compliance must be technologically feasible. Technological 
feasibility is only guaranteed if compliance can be achieved with already existing technology or technol-  17 
ogy that is within reach of a possibly vigorous R&D effort. In other words, environmental regulation is 
expected to stimulate the diffusion of existing technology or at most incremental changes over BAT, at 
the level of the regulated industry. At the level of the individual firm, however, the need for change may 
be substantial if compliance requires the substitution of a dominant design with a new variant and the 
firm has no prior experience in that alternative. 
How does this relate to the 'Porter Hypothesis'? This paper neither validates nor refutes the 'Porter Hy-
pothesis'. Rather it argues that regardless of whether there is massive scope for improvement and firms 
only need to be alerted to this or whether there is not14, actual environmental regulation will not force 
firms to look for it. Since actual environmental regulation is determined on the basis of already existing 
technologies or predictable improvements thereof, compliance does not require the development of 
entirely new technologies, which are too uncertain to serve as a basis for technically and legally feasible 
environmental regulation. Accordingly, whenever minor improvements within the design configuration of 
an existing technology permit increases in resource-efficiency (chemical processes offer plenty of ex-
amples, cf. Faber et al. 1994), economic and environmental goals may by co-optimised. However, since 
only radical innovations ensure unequivocal superiority along all dimensions, 'win-win' situations cannot 
be counted on as a general rule. 
Empirical evidence on the impact of Austrian VOC emission standards supports these conjectures. Al-
though these standards are the strictest of their kind in world, compliance does not seem to have been 
very costly and significant major impact on the affected firms in the Austrian chemical industry could be 
identified. A plausible explanation for this is that compliance technologies had been available for some 
time and a large majority of firms already had some experience with them when the regulations started 
to be devised. Most firms could comply with incremental improvements of these technologies. Some 
firms, however, had to make radical improvements. 
This paper shows that the process how environmental regulation comes about is a non-trivial issue and 
may considerably affect the outcome of the process. In particular, both pollution abatement targets and 
technology do not enter the process as external constants but as endogenous variables. However, the 
paper is only a very preliminary step in this direction and can be extended and refined in various ways. 
An obvious way to refine the main conclusions of this paper is to formally model the political market 
delineated above. The 'composite utility function' sketched out in this paper might serve as a fruitful 
basis and existing models in the public choice literature might be adapted to this end. However, it is 
probably advisable to start with a far less complicated interaction process than the one described above. 
Another route is to provide further evidence on the nature of R&D efforts in response to environmental 
regulation. In this paper, only producers of cleaner products could be studied. One might argue that the 
development of cleaner products represents one-off transition costs while the real costs are borne by 
the users of these products who cannot switch to superior alternatives. Therefore, studies on these us-
ers or on environmental regulation affecting process technology may yield different results. Also, empiri-
cal patterns may be highly technology-specific. For this reason, studies of other technologies and indus-
tries at a similarly disaggregated level might produce interesting insights. 
                                                       
14   Given the present state of knowledge in economics on actual firm behaviour, this is mainly a matter of faith. While standard 
assumptions in neo-classical economics rule out such a possibility, it is not very far-fetched from an evolutionary perspective 
assuming routine-based behaviour (cf. Sinclair-Desgagné 1999 for a lucid treatment of this and related issues).   18 
Finally, it would be very instructive to empirically explore the political negotiation process that precedes 
environmental regulations. This should allow to validate the main claim in this paper that the stringency 
of environmental regulation is based on available technological options. To this end, case-study re-
search on the emergence of environmental regulation might be a highly fruitful route to provide further 
evidence on the interaction processes between suppliers and demanders of environmental regulation. 
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